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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF IDAHO

)
)
Plaintiff-Respondent,
)
)
)
V.
)
EVAN DEAN ANDERSON,
)
)
Defendant-Appellant.
)
_ _ _ _ _ _ _ _)
STATE OF IDAHO,

NO. 46538-2018
ADA COUNTY NO. CR0l-18-11149

APPELLANT'S BRIEF

STATEMENT OF THE CASE
Nature of the Case
Evan Anderson contends the district court abused its discretion when it imposed and
executed his sentence in this case because the rationale it gave for rejecting the sentence he
recommended was not related to any of the sentencing objectives. As such, this Court should
either reduce his sentence as it deems appropriate or, alternatively, remand it for a new
sentencing hearing.

Statement of the Facts & Course of Proceedings
A jury found Mr. Anderson guilty of possessing methamphetamine, and of being a
persistent violator. (R., pp.111-12.) At the sentencing hearing, the district court noted its biggest
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concern was Mr. Anderson's mental health issues, particularly as it related to releasing him back
into the community if he was not on appropriate medications. (See generally Tr., pp.267-69; see
also Tr., p.260, Ls.19-20 (the prosecutor noting that the instant offense occurred three days after

Mr. Anderson was released on parole in an unrelated case).) 1

As such, the district court

indicated the sentence would be crafted, in part, to allow Mr. Anderson to begin identifying an
effective medication regimen and to receive the benefit of new programming opportunities
before being released back into the community. (See Tr., p.270, Ls.15-20, p.271, L.17 - p.272,
L.2.)
Along those same lines, defense counsel had recommended the district court suspend
Mr. Anderson's sentence for a period of probation and include a four-month period of local
incarceration as a term of that probation, as that would allow Mr. Anderson to participate in two
programs offered at the jail. 2 (Tr., p.262, Ls.6-8.) Defense counsel explained that imposing a
suspended sentence would also make it more likely the parole board would allow Mr. Anderson
to return to supervised release when it subsequently decided on the appropriate sanction for his
coinciding parole violation.

(Tr., p.264, Ls.3-5.)

The district court expressly rejected that

alternative in the name of administrative simplicity, stating it did not want Mr. Anderson to have
to report to two different supervising officers who were enforcing two different sets of terms of
release, one for probation in this case and one for parole in the other case.

(Tr., p.270,

L.21 - p.271, L.5.)

1

To promote clarity, it appears that all instances of the word "both" in the transcripts in this case
appears to have been inadvertently replaced with the numeral "124." (See, e.g., Tr., p.17, L.13,
p.261, Ls.9-10.)
2
In the alternative, defense counsel had recommended the district court retain jurisdiction over
Mr. Anderson's case. (Tr., p.262, Ls.9-10.)
2

Instead, the district court imposed and executed a sentence of ten years, with one year
fixed. (Tr., p.270, Ls.4-6; R., pp.117-18.) It explained that, due to credit for time served, that
sentence would make Mr. Anderson parole-eligible within four months. (Tr., p.270, Ls.12-15.)
The district court anticipated Mr. Anderson would receive needed programming during that fourmonth period. (Tr., p.270, Ls.12-20.) Mr. Anderson filed a notice of appeal timely from the
resulting judgment of conviction. (R., pp.117-22.)

ISSUE
Whether the district court abused its discretion by imposing and executing Mr. Anderson's
sentence in this case.

ARGUMENT
The District Court Abused Its Discretion By Imposing And Executing Mr. Anderson's Sentence
In This Case
Sentencing decisions are committed to the district court's discretion. State v. Reinke, l 03
Idaho 771, 771 (Ct. App. 1982). Where a defendant contends that the sentencing court imposed
an excessively harsh sentence, the appellate court will conduct an independent review of the
record, giving consideration to the nature of the offense, the character of the offender, and the
protection of the public interest. See id. at 772. Accordingly, in order to show an abuse of
discretion in the district court's sentencing decision, he must show that, in light of the governing
criteria, the sentence is excessive considering any view of the facts. State v. Jackson, 130 Idaho
293, 294 (1997); see Lunneborg v. My Fun Life, 163 Idaho 856, 863-64 (2018) (articulating the
standard for reviewing whether the district court abused its discretion). The governing criteria,
or sentencing objectives, are: ( 1) protection of society; (2) deterrence of the individual and the
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public generally; (3) the possibility of rehabilitation; and (4) punishment or retribution for
wrongdoing. State v. Charboneau, 124 Idaho 497, 500 (1993).
The protection of society is the primary objective the court should consider. Id. The
Idaho Supreme Court has indicated that rehabilitation is usually the first means the district court
should consider to achieve that goal. See State v. McCoy, 94 Idaho 236, 240 (1971), superseded
on other grounds as stated in State v. Theil, 158 Idaho 103 (2015); accord State v. Bickhart, 164
Idaho 204, 206 (Ct. App. 2018) (noting the preference identified in McCoy does not preclude a
sentence of incarceration, if that is ultimately the best method to achieve the goals of
sentencing). In other words, while the district court may place significant weight on one of the
goals of sentencing, that does not mean it can ignore mitigating factors speaking to one of the
other goals as being insignificant or unimportant. See State v. Knighton, 143 Idaho 318, 320
(2006) (noting that the failure to sufficiently consider various mitigating factors has resulted in
abuses of sentencing discretion in several cases).
In this case, the reason the district court gave for rejecting Mr. Anderson’s sentencing
recommendation – to promote simplicity in the administration of his supervision while on release
– was not a proper consideration under any of the goals of sentencing. The convenience in
administering his supervision is not relevant to whether society needs protection from
Mr. Anderson or whether he could be rehabilitated in the community, nor is it relevant to
punishing or deterring him. See I.C. § 19-2521 (giving additional guidance in how the goals of
sentencing are assessed in regard to the decision of whether to place a person on probation). In
fact, having multiple officers assigned to supervise him would actually probably provide more
protection for society since multiple people would then be watching Mr. Anderson and stepping
in to help him as he worked toward the goal of overcoming the criminogenic factors which got
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him involved in the justice system in the first place. See Idaho Department of Correction
website, “Probation & Parole Officer Duties,” available at https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/
probation_and_parole/probation_and_parole_officer_duties (last accessed 7/16/19).
And even if administrative simplicity were a valid sentencing consideration, the nature of
the district court’s specific concern – that separate officers would be needed to enforce separate
terms for the probation and parole aspects of that potential release – was unfounded, as that does
not reflect a proper understanding of how the supervision process works in Idaho. Specifically,
in Idaho, probation and parole are part of the same division within the Department of Correction.
See Idaho Department of Correction website, “Probation & Parole Overview,” available at
https://www.idoc.idaho.gov/content/probation_and_parole (last accessed 7/16/19). The mission
of that entire division “is to provide for public safety through the supervision of adult felons
under either probation or parole jurisdiction.” Id. (emphasis added). Therefore, that division
seeks to help a person, whether they are on probation or parole, “overcome[e] the criminogenic
factors that involved them in the criminal justice system. See Idaho Department of Correction
website, “Probation & Parole Officer Duties,” supra.
As a result, an officer in that division has the same duties with respect to a person on
probation as he does to a person on parole – to supervise and guide that person in overcoming the
criminological factors in his case by “enforcing individual requirements set forth by courts and
the Commission of Pardons and Parole.” Id. Therefore, regardless of whether the person has
been released on parole or probation, the supervising officer would have the same tasks, such as
conducting home visits, enforcing curfews, verifying employment, coordinating treatment
services, and investigating alleged violations. See id. As a result, even if the district court and
the parole board had each ordered a separate set of terms and conditions for Mr. Anderson’s
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release, only one officer from the Division of Probation and Parole would be needed to supervise
that release. That is also true because most of the terms of release would have likely been the
same - follow the instructions of the supervising officer, go to treatment programs, find and
maintain a job and a residence, do not change residences or jobs without approval of the
supervising officer, stay current on payment of costs, fees, and restitution, etc.
Since the district court expressly based its decision on the consideration of an improper
factor, it abused its discretion. See State v. Van Kamen, 160 Idaho 534, 540 (2016) (finding the
district court abused its discretion when it actually considered an improper factor in making a
sentencing decision (to relinquish jurisdiction) even though it could have reached that same
decision based on proper factors apparent in the record). As such, this Court should grant relief
in this case.

CONCLUSION
Mr. Anderson respectfully requests that this Court reduce his sentence as it deems
appropriate. Alternatively, he requests that his case be remanded to the district court for a new
sentencing hearing.
DATED this 12th day of August, 2019.

/ s/ Brian R. Dickson
BRIAN R. DICKSON
Deputy State Appellate Public Defender
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